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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EXSA H. NIXDORF, 
Plaintiff, 
VS 
N. FREDERICK HICKEN and 
A. JAMES McALLISTER, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
No. 16151 
This is a medical malpractice action brought by the appellant, 
Elsa H. Nixdorf. against Drs. N. Frederick Hicken and A. James 
McAllister, tried before a jury on October 18 and 19, 1978. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the close of the plaintiff's case the lower court granted 
defendants' motion for a directed verdict under Rule 50, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure and entered judgment thereon. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment in favor of the 
defendants anc for a new trial. 
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STATEfi1ENT OF FACTS 
Elsa H. Nixdorf, the plaintiff, was born June 29, 1904 in 
Russia. As a small child she moved to Germany (Tr. 132) where she 
received her schooling. At the age of 21 she emigrated to the United 
States. (Tr. 132-133) She resided 1n Salt Lake City for six or seven 
years before moving to Canada where she married and had five children. 
(Tr. 133-134) After he1- husband died and her children were grown, 
Mrs. Nixdorf returned to Salt Lake City and worked as a cleaning lady 
first at LDS Hospital and then at Wasatch Junior High School. (Tr. 135) 
From approximately 1954 to 1954, Mrs. N1xdorf suffered from 
a cystocele and rectocele. Each of these terms refers to a condition 
where the pelvic d1aphram that normally holds the bladder, rectum and 
uterus up in the abdominal cavity, ruptures and allows these organs to 
slip out of the abdominal cavity. In some instances, the bladder and 
rectum fall down so far that they protrude from the vaginal opemng 
and hang between the woman's legs. Mrs. Nixdorf was such a case. 
When first seen by Dr. Hicken, the plamtiff would actually sit on her 
rectum and bladder when she sat down. The terms "cystocele" and 
"rectocele" refer to the bladder and rectum, respectively, protruding 
from the abdominal cavity. 
Initially, Dr. Hicken discussed w1th Mrs. Nixdorf the fact 
that she needed a hysterectomy. This appears on her office chart 
. 2. 
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on June 2, 1964. ( Tr. 36) However, the plaintiff did not receive 
a hysterectomy. During the course of the operation which occurred 
on June 5, 1964 at the LDS Hospital, Dr. Hicken elected not to per-
form a hysterectomy but to repair the cystocele and rectocele and 
partially amputate the cervix. 
The procedure choosen by Dr. Hicken for this operation 
was to place the plaintiff in a position so that gravity would pull the 
organs back into the abdominal cavity through the tear in the pelvic 
diaphram. (This is the same position a woman assumes when giving 
birth.) (Tr. 31) At that point, the surgeon, working through the 
vaginal opening, would place the organ where it belonged and sew 
the torn diaphram together holding the errant organ in place. 
The procedure on the cystocele went smoothly. It was 
completed without complication and repair of the rectocele was begun. 
After the rectum had been placed in position and while the tear in the 
diaphram was being sewn together, one of the needles being used to 
suture came out of the needle holder. Dr. Hicken admitted at the 
trial that the needle holder exerts a very powerful grip on the needle, 
so powerful in fact that he could not take the needle out of the 
needleholder by exerting pressure. (Tr. 120) The Record of 
Surgical Operation, pages 14 and 15, plaintiff's Exhibit "l", reported 
the loss as follows: 
. 3. 
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"A small curved cutting needle was broken 
while repairing the rectocele and is apparently 
lying in the levator ani or the guluteus muscle 
or fascia on the left side. Time was spent 
to palpate in an attempt to find the needle 
and, but this was never found." 
At trial, Dr. Hicken admitted that in fact no needle was broken during 
the operation and that an entire needle was left in the operating site. 
(Tr. 107-108) 
The plaintiff had no knowledge that a cutting needle had been 
left in her body until she consulted Dr. Robert K. Maddock of this 
city complaining of abdominal pain. In the course of examination and 
treatment, Dr. Maddock ordered x-rays of the lower abdorr.en of plaintiff 
and on August 12, 1976, identified a curved cutting needle. Dr. 
Maddock testified that based on a pelvic examination he performed on the 
plaintiff, and as corroborated by a radiological report by Dr. G. N. 
Baldwin, it was medically probable that the needle was between the 
vagina and the rectum. (Tr. 71, 76, 77) 
Dr. Hicken testified at trial, again contrary to what was entered 
on the surgical report, that he knew where the needle was -- in the 
wall between the rectum and the vagina. (Tr. lll) During the course 
of the operation and at the time Dr. Hicken knew that a needle had 
been left in the body of plaintiff, there was x-ray equipment available 
to him that would have identified the position of the needle. Dr. Hicken 
chose not to x-ray the site because the x-ray equipment would have 
had to have been brought to the operating room and because he "knew 
. 4. 
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that a needle left in this particular area was not particularly harm-
ful to the patient." Dr. Hicken testified, however, that this was a 
sharp, pointed surgical cutting needle left in an area where he did 
not feel it safe to palpate because of a number of sensitive organs 
in this vicinity. Dr. Hicken also testified that the needle was in-
bedded in muscle, which tends to expand and contract and as it 
did so, the point would come in contact with nerves and small blood 
vessels and cause pain. 
Dr. Hicken rationalized his decision not to inform plaintiff 
of the needle left in her body on the grounds that it would be a 
source of irritation and worry and because it might elevate her 
blood pressure. (Tr. 118) ·Also, Dr. Hicken never told any of the 
plaintiff's relatives about the condition and did not inform his partner 
Dr. A. James McAllister. As time passed, Dr. Hicken retired and 
Dr. McAllister continued to see the plaintiff. She complained of lower 
abdominal pain which Dr. McAllister diagnosed as a "kidney stone". 
(Tr. 127) She did have high blood pressure, but it was successfully 
treated by Dr. McAllister. 
Mrs. Nixdorf experienced continuous lower abdominal pain 
after the needle was left in her. She reported this condition to Dr. 
McAllister. Interestingly, a copy of the surgical note from the record 
of the LOS Hospital indicating the lost needle is in the office chart of 
Hicken and McAllister. However, Dr. McAllister was not aware of the 
0 5. 
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fact that a needle had been left in the abdomen of Mrs. Nixdorf until 
legal procedures were commenced. How a doctor can propose to treat 
a patient without knowing what the office file contains is most puzzling. 
As indicated above, the first time that Mrs. Nixdorf or any-
one else learned of the needle in her abdomen was in August, 1976 
when Dr. Robert K. Maddock was notified by the x-ray specialist 
that a foreign body had shown up on x-rays of the plaintiff. Dr. 
Maddock testified at trial: 
"I called her (the plaintiff's daughter) on the 
telephone to report the finding because this 
is a pretty much standard procedure. When 
you have an abnormal x-ray of any kind or an 
abnormal test which is of some significance, 
you should let the patient know immediately." 
(Tr. 70) 
The above testimony is very significant and will be discussed 
in more detail under the points of argument concerning a physician's 
duty to disclose. 
To this point the facts have shown that the plaintiff was oper-
ated upon and that during the course of the operation a needle was left 
in her abdomen. She had no knowledge of this foreign object unt1l 
August of 1976 -- twelve years after the event. During these years 
she suffered accute pain and distress and had no idea what was causing 
the condition. 
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Mrs. Nixdorf testified that after the operation, "I didn't--
! didn't feel very good. Always bothered me. It always bothered 
me. I didn't feel very good. It wasn't-- I was-- I got everything 
taken out but I didn't feel good. I always didn't feel good." 
(Tr. 137) The pain was on the left side (Tr. 140) in the groin area 
and came and went and was worse when she had to work. (Tr.l38) 
She also suffered from back pain. (Tr. 140) The plaintiff testified 
that she suffered excruciating pain when she underwent the pelvic 
examination by Dr. Maddock at Holy Cross Hospital operating room. 
The pain is particularly severe when she travels by car. 
A. Once I went to Canada when I stopped working. 
Q. Now, this was after the operation, wasn't it? 
A. Yah, Uh-huh. 
Q. And after you had -- and after you had quit work? 
A. Yah, we went to Canada. 
Q. And what happened? 
A. Oh, I hardly made it. They had to stop the car. 
went outside and stood for awhile and I-- well, then I felt a little 
better but then I couldn't stand there forever so I had to go in 
the car again and, my, did I have a trip. When we came back it was 
the worst. 
Q. Were you in pain? 
A. Oh, v hat a pain. 
Q. Where? 
0 7. 
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·;;~s sc painful. Oh, :T(/, did I pain and r.o·:; si:-tce I r-.e~-'e~ ·::c.nteG to 
dri·1e mth the car for far. A little blt here upto·;;n I gc ·mth ;.;1· C:c.ughter 
but I ·,;ould rathe: ·naH:. aJ<;;ays v;c.lk. 
0. Can you ·nalk dovmto·nn? 
A. I ::e:k :l·:c:mtO'IIn. I pay my bills. Walk dov:ntov;n. I do 
everything walking. don't like to drive m a car because it bothers me. 
Q. Is 1t th<O sitting down and the motion that causes the 
pain? 
A. Yeah, the move -- when the car moves, you know, it 
rno•1es my everything, my whole body, and that needle sits right here. 
I can feel it. It starts sticking-- sticking in me." ( Tr. 144-145) 
The every day chore of housework is painful to the plaintiff: 
"Q. Are you able to take care of your apartment by your-
self? 
A. Yeah, I do. Well, I have nobody that comes in there. 
I'm alone and it stays clean and I do it when I-- when I feel like and 
the I take lots of Anacins and asprins to kill the pain. 
Q. And when you do the cleaning in your apartment, does 
that cause you to have pain? 
. 8. 
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A. You mean if I--
Q. When you move around doing your housework, does 
that cause you any pain? 
A. If I watch it now -- if I don't move my body, I can 
move around but if I move around here that part moves, too. I can 
feel it right away. got it down now. The needle is a little bit 
down now. This was up. It's down again. I can feel it when it 
moves. I can feel it. Oh, my, it's sure pain. That pain's awful and 
don't know what it was. See, if they at least would have told me, 
could take care of myself better but nobC>d:· said anything. Thc:t's 
it. Notod:/ told me what I had." (Tr. 146-147) 
The needle was lost in the thin wall between the rectum and 
vagina (Tr. 111) and to a medical probability that is where it lies now. 
( T r. 76- 77) On the subject of pain in this area, Dr. McAllister testi-
fied: "On the cervix of the uterus we can burn that cervix and 
cauterize ulcers, remove polyps without anesthetic without pain but 
one certainly better not touch the wall of the vagina with that hot 
needle or we will be picking her off of the chandeliers." ( Tr. 130) 
The court below directed a verdict against -laintiff at the 
close of plaintiff's case. The lower court seemed to be overwhelmed 
with the concept that the plaintiff in every malpractice case must pro-
. 9. 
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duce an expert witness to testify that the offending health care pro-
vider violated the standard of care in the community. There are ex-
ceptions to that rule. One exception is where a surgeon leaves foreign 
objects in the body of a patient. This concept will be explored under 
points I and II which follow. Additionally, this Court will be requested 
to rule on a matter of first impression and that is the duty of a sur-
geon to disclose to a patient that he left a foreign object in the patient's 
body. The failure to disclose being actionable. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT I!VlPROPERLY GRANTED 
DEFENDANTS'MOTION FOR DIRECTED 
VERDICT WHERE PLAINTIFF HAD INTRO-
DUCED EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO INVOKE 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR. 
Since on a motion for a directed verdict the court must re-
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against 
whom the motion is made and res ipsa loquitur raises an inference of 
negligence, a court mc.y not properly grant a directed verdict against 
the party who has validly invoked the doctrine. This Court so stated 
in the case of Moore v James, 5 Utah 2d 91, 297 P2d 221. (1956). 
"The rule, where applicable, gives rise to an inference of 
negligence which carries the plaintiff's case past non-suit. 
The trial court must determine the applicability of the rule 
at the close of the plaintiff's case, where the sufficiency 
of the evidence is challenged by a motion for non-suit. 
If, at the time the evidence eliminates the plaintiff as 
. 10. 
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the responsible cause of the accident, and if the 
other requirements of the rule are satisfied, the 
court must deny the motion for non-suit and the 
rule applies." 297 P2d at 224. 
Accord, Sanone v J. C. Penney Co., 17 Utah 2d 46, 
404 P2d at 248 (1965); and Lund v Phillips Petroleum Company, 10 
Utah 2d 276, 351 P2d 952 ( 1960). 
The elements of res ipsa loquitur in an ordinary negligence 
case, are these: 
" ( 1) That the accident was of a kind which in 
the ordinary course of events would not have 
happened had due care been observed; 
( 2) That it happened irrespective of any par-
ticipation by plaintiff; and 
( 3) That the cause thereof was something under 
the management or control of the defendant, or 
for which it is responsible." 
Wightman v Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 5 Utah 2d 
373, 302 P2d 471 ( 1956) 
The doctrine may be applied in a medical malpractice case. 
Talbot v Dr. W. H. Groves, Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 21 Utah 2d 
73, 440 P2d 872, ( 1968) 
"Our examination of the decisions of this court 
would indicate that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur has not been applied in a malpractice 
case of this nature in this jurisdiction. However, 
prior decisions do not indicate that the doctrine 
has no ,application in this type of case, and we 
are of the opinion that if there is sufficient 
evidentiary foundation the doctrine should be 
applied." 
. ll. 
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A: PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENTIARY BASIS WAS SUFFICIENT 
TO INVOKE THE DOCTRINE. 
The first element of res ipsa loquitur set out in Wightman, 
supra., is that the accident probably would not have occurred without 
negligence. Plamtiff introduced evidence at trial to establish the fact 
that the needle would not have gotten out of the needleholder in the 
place it did without negligence. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "9", a curved needle holder, which Dr. 
Hicken agreed was the type used during the operation on Mrs. Nix-
dorf was admitted into evidence. (Tr. 49) Also admitted were de-
fendants' Exhibit "10" and plaintJff's Exhibit "8" which are curved cutting 
needles which Dr. Hicken agreed were similar to the ones used on ~lrs. 
Nixdorf. (Tr. 52 and Tr. 97, respectively.) 
A needleholder can best be d1scribed in common parlance as 
a long- handled scissor-like device with a rachet-like device near the 
scissor grips to hold the needle secure when the rachet is engaged. 
When the rachet JS engaged, it exerts a vice-lii:e grip on the needle. 
Dr. Hicken agreed that when the needle and needleholder are handed to 
him during an operation, they are clean, dry and sterile. (Tr. 120) 
At the trial, in front of the jury, Dr. Hicken was presented with a 
needle locked in the needleholder. He agreed that the needleholdcr 
exerted a very pov;erful grip on the needle and stated: "In fact, I 
can't take it out of there by exerting pressure." It was a proven 
fact to anyone in the courtroom that the needle could not pull out of 
the needle holder when the rachet was engaged. Since Exhibits "8", 
. 12. 
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"9" and "10" have been included in the record on appeal, the mem-
bers of this Court are urged to satisfy themselves in that regard. 
Dr. Hicken testified that when he removed the needle-
holder from Mrs. Nixdorf's body and discovered the needle wasn't 
in it any longer, he assumed that the needle had broken. (Tr. 108) 
Had he taken the precaution of having the site x-rayed, he would 
have known otherwise. At the time of trial, Dr. Hicken agreed that 
in fact the needle was not broken, ( Tr. 107) and that he did not 
know how the needle got out of the holder. ( Tr. 98- 99) The doctor 
also agreed that it was uncommon to leave objects inside a patient's 
abdomen. (Tr. 113) 
The standard procedure in suturing is to insert the needle 
and suture through the flesh with the needleholder until the tip can 
be grasped by a forceps and the needle and suture pulled through 
the tissue. Further, the standard procedure is to have the needle 
either in the holder or in the forceps at all times. Any procedure 
other than that violates the standard. This inference is clearly drawn 
from the testimony of Dr. Hicken on page 99 of the transcript: 
"Q. You are the one that held that needle holder at the 
time, were you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you were using it to suture interior tissue in her 
body? 
. 13. 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And you indicated that it could have gotten away simply 
by slipping out, it that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Or it could have come out had the ratchet been disen-
gaged by you? 
A. It could. 
Q. Yes. And in either event. that needle at that time was 
free and not mechanically held by you, is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. But the standard procedure is to have that needle either 
in the holder or in a -- what did you call that other instrument? 
A. Forcep. 
Q. Forcepped alternately, is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So that if the forcep is holding it then you release 
the ratchet on the needleholder and pull it all the way through and 
start fresh again with a new one because you take that needle right 
out, don't you? 
A. Yes." 
It is clear from the evidence that the needle was released from 
the needle holder before Dr. Hicken could grasp it firmly with the for-
ceps and complete the suturing process. How the needle got loose is 
. 14. 
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not known. However, in view of the fact that a needleholder exerts 
a vice-like grip on the needle, the jury could well have found that 
the logical inference is that Dr. Hicken released the ratchet on the 
needleholder prior to the time that the tip of the needle was at a 
place where it could be grasped with the forceps and pulled through 
the tissue. The medical standard as testified to by Dr. Hicken is 
that the needle should either be in the needleholder or forceps at 
all times. From the fact that the needle was released prematurely, 
the jury could find, indeed should find that Dr. Hicken was guilty 
of negligence. The only explanation offered by Dr. Hicken was that 
the needle and needleholder once inside the body are surrounded by 
blood, fats and oils and that may cause the needle to slip loose. 
However, when it is remembered that the needle and needleholder are 
handed to him sterile and dry and that it is virtually impossible to 
pull the needle from the needleholder when the ratchet is engaged, 
that explanation is unlikely. Furthermore, he did not know how the 
needle got out of the holder and testified that it could have simply 
slipped out; or it could have come out if the ratchet had been dis-
engaged by him. 
The most likely explanation is that he, like all surgeons, 
move rapidly; suturing becomes somewhat mechanical and is done by 
habit; and on this particular occasion he released the ratchet before 
grasping the needle with the forceps . 
. IS. 
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The evidence presented a jury question under the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur. 
POINT II: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT 
WAS Ifi1PROPERLY GRANTED BECAUSE EXPERT 
TESTIMONY IS NOT NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH 
NEGLIGENCE WHERE A SURGEON LEAVES SUR-
GICAL INSTRUMENTS IN THE OPERATING SITE. 
Although the general rule is that expert testimony is needed 
to establish the standard of care in the medical malpractice case, 
Huggins v Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P2d 523, the number of cases 
holding that expert testimony is not necessary to establish a standard 
of care where a doctor leaves foreign objects inside a patient are legion. 
See Annotation, 10 ALR3d 9, Malpractice: Liability of Physician, Sur-
geon, Anesthetist, or Dentist for injury resulting from foreign objects 
left in patient. 
This Court recognized that exception to the general rule in 
Fredrickson v Maw, 119 Utah 385, 227 P2d 772, where the defendant 
surgeon left a sponge in a patient 'Nhich caused her pain and discom-
fort for approximately three years. Speaking for a unanimous court 
Justice Latimer said: 
"So far as establishing negligence on the part of 
the doctor in this type of case is concerned, it 
would appear to be a matter of common knowledge 
that due care is lacking if the surgical instruments, 
sponges or medical supplies are not removed before 
an incision is closed or the wound heals; ... " 
. 16. 
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Chief Justice Henroid in his dissenting opinion in Maim-
strom v Olsen, 16 Utah 2d 316, 400 P2d 209, puts the matter very 
poignantly: 
"In that case, (Frederickson, supra.) of course, in-
cluding the lowly midwife, anyone would conclude 
that leaving flotsam and jetsam in the sewed-up 
innards of a trusting patient would not merit a 
kudos at the medical college. Not even a flunked 
pre-med student would or could attest to the prop-
osition that expert testimony would be necessary 
to conclude that leaving sponges and knives and 
other sundry nick-nacks in the throat, or elsewhere, 
was not standard chiropractice (sic) in the com-
munity." 
Notwithstanding this overwhelming weight of authority 
both from Utah and other jurisdictions, the trial court granted 
defendants' motion for a directed verdict evidently because plaintiff 
had not produced an expert witness to testify that it was contrary 
to the medical standard of care to leave surgical instruments in the 
abdomen of Mrs. Nixdorf. 
The lower court missed the legal thesis of plaintiff's 
case and the rationale of the many cases on this point. The negli-
gence is the act of allowing the surgical instrument or other para-
phernalia to become lost, miscounted or whatever. Once that fact is 
established, as it was in this case, the doctrine of Fredrickson v Maw, 
supra., applies. Prima facie evidence of negligence is established and 
the final result is the function of the jury. The testimony of medical 
experts at that point could only be in mitigat10n of the problem and 
. 17. 
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not to establish or refute negligence. 
Dr. Hicken testified on the subject, but his testimony was 
not helpful to him. Knowing the needle had been lost by him, Dr. 
Hicken palpated to see if he could find the needle. He could not. 
(Tr. 110) An x-ray machine was available, but he chose not to use 
it stating that Mrs. Nixdorf was not in the best physical condition 
and the x-ray machine would have to be brought from another part 
of the building. He also testified that based on his experience needles 
"left in that area were not particularly harmful to the patient." ( Tr. 110) 
His overall testimony on the point, however, would indicate otherwise. 
"Q. You didn't know where the needle was, did you? 
A. Yes, knew the definite vicinity of where it was. 
Q. If you knew where it was, why didn't you get it out? 
A. Because I didn't want to damage tissues in which it 
was imbedded. 
Q. It was very close not only to the bladder but the rectum, 
wasn't it? 
A. It was in the wall between the rectum and vagina. 
Q. All right, now, that is in position where that needle could 
do damage, isn't it, to that organ? 
A. It is in the position where it could if it would migrate 
through." (Tr. lll) 
"Q. All right, now, that needle had taken a bite of muscle 
. lB. 
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before you lost it, isn't that correct? It was into the muscle? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. Now, of course, muscles in the body are 
something that expand and retract, are they not? They move, don't 
they? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If the needle was contained in the muscle, we 
could expect that muscle to expand and contract, couldn't we? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And every time you press fless (sic) across the point 
of that needle it is going to come in contact with nerves, small blood 
vessles and what have you, is it not? 
that? 
A. It could. 
Q. And that would produce pain, wouldn't it? 
A. If it did, it would. 
Q. Yes. All right. It is in the position certainly to do 
A. Yes, sir. (Tr. 1!5) 
Despite the concern expressed by Dr. Hicken over Mrs. 
Nixdorf's ability to tolerate the procedure, the anesthesia report in-
dicates that Mrs. Nixdorf's blook pressure and pluse did not vary 
signifJcantly during the operation. 
Dr. Hicken testified that it was uncommon to leave things 
. 19. 
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in a patient's abdomen. 
The statements of the doctor arc contradictory. At one 
point he says that the needle was in a place where it would not do 
any harm. He testified further that he did not palpate extensively 
because c:' the damage that could be caused to tissue. He goes into 
the matter further and extensively by indicating that the needle was 
in a position where it could produce pain and damage. 
The evidence before the jury at the close of plaintiff's case 
was that Dr. Hicken had left a needle in the plaintiff's abdomen when 
he sewed her up. There was an x-ray machine available but not used. 
The instrument left !:lehind was a sharp. pointed surgical cutting needle 
sandwiched between the rectum and vagina in a position to do damage 
to those organs and cause pain to Mrs. Nixdorf. The testimony of 
Mrs. Nixdorf is that the needle was and still is extremely painful. 
Virtually every court in the natwn, including this one, has sa1d that 
those are facts from which laymen are competent to infer a lack of due 
care. 
The lower court in this case seemed to fashion a new rule 
wh1ch in effect says that if a surgeon admits that he leaves hardware 
in the body of a patient, no jury question is presented unless an ex-
pert testifies that he violated the standard of care for not getting the 
hardware out of the body. Such a rule is illogical and has no support. 
. 20. 
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The correct rule is stated in the case of Reinhold v 
Spencer, 53 Idaho 688, 26 P2d 796. In this case the defendant 
surgeon broke a needle off in the plaintiff's chest while tapping 
the plaintiff's lungs. The defendant appealed from a verdict for 
the plaintiff partly on the ground that a non-suit should have been 
granted him because there was no expert evidence to establish that 
he had been negligent. The court, after review of the facts, dis-
agreed and said: 
"It has been variously held that a surgeon's failure 
to remove a foreign object, such as a sponge, 
gauze pad, part of an instrument, etc. is negli-
gence per se, necessarily negligence, and negli-
gence, and in all events it is uniformly held that 
the failure to remove such foreign object is evi-
dence of negligence and sufficient for submission 
to the jury without the aid of expert testimony." 
(Emphasis supplied) 
The Supreme Court of Washington reached a similar result 
in Madis v Stellwagen, 38 Wash. 2d 1, 227 P2d 445. During the 
course of an operation on one of the eyes of the plaintiff, the 
defendant surgeon inserted a number of metalic needles each one 
threaded with black silk. When the operation was finished the needles 
were removed, but one of the needles remained in the eye. No use 
was made of an x-ray to aid in discovering the needle. Later, x-ray 
equipment located -,he needle and it was removed. 
The surgeon was charged with negligently leaving a needle 
used in the operation in appellant's eye, and also in failing to remove 
the needle. The court ruled: 
. 21. 
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"When it was made to appear that the needle had been 
left in appellant's eye, and that by use of the x-ray 
its presence and locatiOn later became known, the jury 
would have had the right to infer that if the x-ray had 
been used before the operation was closed the presence 
of the needle would have been discovered and could 
have been removed." 
"We have considered the theory of respondent as out-
lined in his statement of question involved and in his 
brief to the effect that a case for the jury was not 
made out when it appeared that the respondent closed 
the operation knowning that a needle was missing, and, 
believing that it was either in the eye or in the orbit, 
made a search for such needle until in his professional 
judgment further search would endanger the safety of 
the patJent. The theory is not tenable in view of the 
inference which may be drawn from the failure of re-
spondent before closing the operation to use x-ray 
equipment in an effort to locate the needle in the eye. 
It was the duty of respondent when he either knew 
or had good reason to believe that the missing needle 
was or might be in the eye, to use available methods 
known to his profession to locate the missing needle." 
The evidence in the case at bar is that the doctor although 
knowing where the needle had been left, did very little to locate and 
remove the same and did not use the x-ray equipment that could 
have been made available. 
The Colorado case of l'vludd v Dorr. 57 4 P2d 97, (Colo. App. 
1977) is in all respects like this case. In the Colorado case the sur-
geon left a cottonoid sponge in the patient. Action was instituted on 
two grounds, namely the surgeon's failure to inform the patient of the 
risks involved and negligence in leaving the sponge in her body. 
The lower court directed a verdict in the defendant's favor on the 
negligence claim, but submitted the informed consent issue to the 
jury which found in the surgeon's favor . 
. 22. 
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The appeals court ruled that where a foreign object is 
lost in a patient, a prima facie case of negligence is made out and 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies and since the evidence 
established all requisite conditions, it was error for the lower court 
to direct a verdict because of plaintiff's failure to present expert 
testimony. 
The court stated, in part, as follows: 
"Dr. Dorr argues, however, that when he dis-
covered that the cottonoid sponge was missing, he 
acted reasonably and in conformity with community 
medical standards in searching for it. He asserts 
that the trial court correctly concluded that his 
abandoning that search was based on h1s medical 
judgment, a matter not within the jury's competence, 
and that Mrs. Mudd's condition at the time was 
such that any prudent surgeon would have closed 
the incision. 
"However exhaustive Dr. Dorr's search after dis-
covery of the sponge's disappearance, and how-
ever exemplary his decision to close without its 
retrieval, the fact remains that when Mrs. Mudd 
left his care, a sponge remained within her body. 
The measures taken by Dr. Dorr and his surgical 
team after losing the cottonoid sponge in no way 
obviate the doctor's failure initially to take pre-
cautions sufficient to prevent the loss. 
Accordingly, since the evidence in this case estab-
lished all requisite conditions, the trial court's 
refusal to instruct on the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur and its direction of a verdict for defendant 
because of plaintiff's failure to present expert 
testimony was error." 
. 23. 
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From the above review of the evidence and the applicable 
case law, it is clear that the trial court committed reversible error 
in directing a verdict against plaintiff o 
POii;T III: A SURGEON HAS A DUTY TO DISCLOSE 
TO A PATIENT THAT HE LEFT A FOREIGN 
OBJECT IN THE PATIENT'S BODY AND 
HIS F AlLURE TO SO INFORM GIVES RISE 
TO AN ACTIONABLE WRONG 0 
The trial court refused to submit to the jury as an issue 
of actionable wrong the failure of the surgeon to inform plamtiff that 
he had left a needle in her body 0 We may assume that the court did 
so on the ground that plaintiff did not produce a medical expert who 
would testify that the surgeon had violated a standard of care in 
failing to inform the plaintiff. 
This question is a matter of first impression before the 
Utah Supreme Court and the decision will have a far reaching effect 0 
This Court can go forward and say that a person has a right to know 
if hardware is left behind in the body by the surgeon and concealment 
of that fact may go to a ju:- without expert testimony or the Court 
0 240 
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can decide that a doctor is not liable for concealing the fact that 
he left a needle in the body of a patient unless another doctor will 
testify that a standard of care was violated. To adopt the latter 
point of view will place this state in the dark ages of medical mal-
practice. This rule will allow a negligent doctor to conceal the 
fact of the mistake simply by saying that in his judgment the patient 
should not be told and then stand behind the shield of some fanciful 
"standard of care" fashioned by his medical colleagues to the effect 
that if he merely erred in his judgment he would not be guilty of 
malpractice because no one can question judgmental decisions of a 
doctor. This particular bit of forensic jargon has served to protect 
the medical profession from its mistakes for too long. There may have 
been a time in history when people were child-like, uneducated, un-
sophisticated and superstitious concerning the healing arts and what 
was happening within their body. That time has long since passed. 
A person has an absolute right to be informed by a doctor when a 
medical error has been made and particularly has a right to know 
when a surgeon leaves surgical instruments in his body. The sur-
geon has an absolute duty to disclose that fact to a patient. Discre-
tion plays no role in a matter such as this. This principle which the 
Court must adopt is soundly supported by cases from other jurisdic-
tions. 
InthecaseofTaylorvMilton, 353Mich. 421. 92N.W. 2d 
57, ( 1958) plaintiff sued the defendant physician who failed to dis-
. 25. 
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close to the patient that a filiform had broken off a cateter the de-
fendant had inserted in the patient's urethra. The defendant doctor 
appealed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff. One error urged by 
the defendant doctor was that the court did not require expert testi-
many. The appeals court quoting the lower court's instruction stated 
and held as follows: 
'"I charge you that there is no question in skill or 
judgment, no question of practice beyond the know-
lege of laymen, because you are only considering 
the one question: did he or did he not conceal the 
presence of this filiform in the bladder of this plain-
tiff.' This statement finds square support in LeFaive 
v Asselin, 262 fvlich. 443, 247 N. W. 911. We are con-
cerned here with a broken needle-like steel-capped 
object some 12 inches long admittedly left in the 
man's bladder. To borrow Mr. Justice Wiest's much 
quoted phrase in Ballance v Dunnington, 241 1\lich. 
383, 387, 217 N.W. 329, 52 A.L.R. 262 even the 
"merest tyro" might know that a doctor's concealment 
of such a state of affairs from a patient was imp roper." 
Finding no error, the court affirmed. 
In Tramutola v Bartone, 118 N.J. Super. 503, 288 A2d 
863. The plaintiff had undergone surgery on her right lung in 1960 
and afterward complained of a sharp pain in her chest. During the 
operation a needle had broken off above her right breast. Although 
the needle was clearly apparent in x-rays taken after surgery, and 
for four years thereafter. neither the surgeon who performed the 
operation nor her attending physician informed the plaintiff of the 
presence of the needle in her body. 
A verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed on appeal. One of 
the c;rrors assigned by the defendant doctors was that there was no 
0 26. 
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expert testimony to the effect that they had a duty to disclose 
to the patient that a needle had been left in her body. Answering 
this contention the court stated: 
"The negligence charged against Dr. Elwood in 
this case was his failure to disclose to plaintiff 
that a foreign object was left in her body during 
the operation performed by Dr. Bartone. Where 
a surgeon knows or has reason to believe that 
he left a foreign object in his patient's body 
during an operation, he has a duty to disclose 
the facts to his patient, absent any sound medi-
cal reason for not doing so." 
Smith v Zeagler, 157 So. 328, (Fla. 1934) 
"But, even if it had been shown that the defend-
ant was required by the urgent necessity of the 
case to leave a sponge in his patient's abdomen, 
because of the dangers attendant upon delay to 
further explore for it, it was the legal duty of 
the physician to so inform his patient within a 
reasonable time thereafter by advising her of 
what he had been compelled to do, in order that 
she might seek as early relief from the effects 
of the foreign object left in her body, as her 
condition might permit." 
Schoendorf£ v Society of New York Hospital. 211 N.Y. 125, 
105N.E. 92 
"Every human being of adult years and sound 
mind has a right to determine what shall be done 
with his own body." 
In Morrison v Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 198 P2d 590 the Arizona 
Court liibled the failure to disclose to a patient the existence of a 
foreign object within his body as "constructive fraud" . 
. 27. 
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A collection of cases on this subject is set forth in 10 
A .L. R. 3d tllalpractice -- Fore1gn Objects at page 37. The Court will 
note that the rule to be adopted by this Court is supported by 
the majority of courts considering the subject. 
It may be asked whether Dr. Hicken had a sound medi-
cal reason for not disclosing the fact that he left a needle in Mrs. 
Nixdorf. He testified that the reason he did not tell her is because 
she had "linquistic difficulties, she was worried and nervous and 
had high blood pressure. " ( Tr. 118) On redirect examination he 
refuted those reasons. 
"Q. No·N doctor, you gave some reasons why you didn't 
tell Mrs. Nixdorf about her needle. One of those was that she 
had high blood pressure, is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, high blood pressure is a medically treatable 
disease, is it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then actually a person with high blood pressure 
has a right to know what is going on in his or her own body, does 
he not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And a person who has a linquistic difficulty, should 
certainly have a right to know what is going on in his or her own 
body? Should that person not know? 
A. They should. 
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Q. All right. Now, there is alot of nervous people 
in the world, alot of us are nervous, aren't we? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. I'm nervous today. 
A. Granted. 
Q. All right. Certainly we ought to have a right to 
know what is going on in our body, shouldn't we? Yes? 
A. Yes." (Tr. 121-122) 
The foregoing testimony does not excuse Dr. Hicken from 
informing plaintiff of the fact that he left a needle in her abdomen. 
The Court is again reminded of the testimony of Dr. Maddock con-
cerning the proper method and standard: 
"When you have an abnormal x-ray of any kind 
or an abnormal test which is of some significance, 
you should let the patient know immediately." 
(Tr. 70) 
Certainly this testimony applies with equal force where 
something goes wrong during the course of an operation. 
This Court must state with certainty that when a surgeon 
leaves a foreign object in the body of a patient, he must inform the 
patient of that fact so that the patient can select a further course 
of treatment to correct the condition, if possible. In this case, as 
in most cases where a foreign object is left in the body, the sufficiency 
of reasons given for non-disclosure are questions for the jury. To do 
otherwise will er. .e the negligent doctor to escape the consequence 
. 29. 
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of his error by stating: "It was my judgment not to tell the patient." 
The time has come when this Court must say that in a 
matter as flagrant and obvious as this, lay people on juries are 
competent and intelligent enough to fairly decide the rssues between 
the doctor who leaves a needle in an operatwn, fails to disclose the 
fact, and the patient who must bear the consequence. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff proved all elements necessary to invoke the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur, namely: 
" ( l) That the accident was of a kind which, in the 
ordinary course of events would not have happened 
had due care been observed; 
( 2) That it happened irrespective of any participation 
by plaintiff; and 
( 3) That the cause thereof was something under the 
management or control of the defendant, or for whrch 
it is responsible." 
Closely akin to that doctrine is the special doctrine applied 
in medical malpractice cases wherein the surgeon fails to remove a 
foreign object in the body of a patient. That is prima facie evidence 
. 30. 
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of negligence. Both points were satisfied by the evidence produced 
by plaintiff. The defendants produced no evidence to the contrary. 
A jury question was clearly presented. 
As a separate, independent ground of recovery, plaintiff 
proved that the surgeon fraudulently concealed the fact that he left 
a needle in the body of the plaintiff. The failure to disclose gives 
rise to a separate, independent ground of liability which presented 
an issue for the jury. 
Based upon the foregoing, the trial court committed 
error in granting a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's 
case and this action should be reversed and the case remanded 
for a new trial. 
0 31. 
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